Colorado's Minimum Wage Increases 3.8%, to $7.64 Per Hour

iStock_000017953455XSmall.jpgEffective January 1, 2012, Colorado's minimum wage increased by $0.28, from $7.36 per hour to $7.64 per hour (for tipped employees, from $4.34 to $4.62).  This is $0.39 more than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.  

The new minimum wage requirement is set forth in Colorado Minimum Wage Order 28 (PDF) now in effect. Because employers in Colorado must comply with both federal (Fair Labor Standards Act) and state (Colorado Wage Act) laws, the higher prevailing wage must be paid to employees.

This $0.28 increase represents the 3.8% increase to the Denver-Boulder-Greeley Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 2010 to 2011. Colorado is one of eight states with a minimum wage tied to inflation. The other states include Arizona, Florida, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Colorado's inflationary adjustment requirement was passed by a relatively close vote on Amendment 42 to the Colorado Constitution in 2006 (823,526 in favor; 721,530 against).

According to the Bell Policy Center in Denver, and as reported by the Denver Post, this year's minimum wage increase will affect 74,000 workers in Colorado, or 3.4% of Colorado's workforce.  

More information about the 2012 Colorado minimum wage increase can be found on the Colorado Department of Labor website.

Denver Voters Reject Paid Sick Time Ordinance

iStock_000016442205XSmall.jpgAs of 11:50 p.m. on November 1, 2011, the City and County of Denver Coordinated Election results were in.  By a margin of 66,719 votes (64.02%) against to 37,498 votes (35.98%) in favor, Ballot Initiative 300 - the Denver Paid Sick and Safe Time Ordinance, failed. 

I wrote about this proposed new legislation that would impact employers and workers in the City and County of Denver in my prior blog post: Proposed Denver Paid Sick and Safe Time Ordinance: Nothing to Sneeze At

As pointed out by the National Restaurant Association in a recent Huffington Post article, businesses on the whole are not opposed to providing sick leave for their workers, but are opposed to the poorly worded legislation that had unintended consequences.  It looks like Denver voters resoundingly agreed.

Proposed Denver Paid Sick and Safe Time Ordinance: Nothing To Sneeze At

Sneeze.jpgPromoting public health? Sounds good. Making sure working adults stay at home when they are sick? I'm on board. Flexible and supportive working environment? Of course, who doesn't want that.

Voters in San Francisco, Washington D.C., Milwaukee, and Connecticut were motivated by these ideals when passing paid sick leave ordinances or bills in their cities or state (although Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker nullified Milwaukee's bill after it was passed). You can bet voters in Denver, too, will be equally motivated by these ideals and the desire to help working families and low income wage earners when deciding Ballot Initiative 300 in November 2011. 

But, what exactly is the proposed Denver Paid Sick and Safe Time Ordinance (PDF), and is it really a good idea for Denver?   

Key Provisions of Denver's Proposed Paid Sick and Safe Time Ordinance

  • Provides paid sick and safe time leave for all employees within the geographic boundaries of the City and County of Denver, including part-time and temporary employees, who work at least 40 hours a year (federal and state government employees and union members are exempt).
  • All Colorado employers who employ eligible workers in the City and County of Denver must comply, regardless of size, but new businesses are exempt during their first year of operation.
  • Paid leave would accrue at the rate of 1 hour for every 30 hours worked.  
  • Large employers, defined as employers with 10 or more employees, must offer up to 72 hours, or 9 days, of paid leave each calendar year.  
  • Small employers, defined as those with less than 10 employees, must offer up to 40 hours, or 5 days, of paid leave each calendar year.  
  • Up to 72 hours, or 9 days, of paid leave may be carried over from year to year.
  • Paid leave may be taken after 90 days of employment, and may be taken in as few as 1 hour increments.  
  • No advance notice is required for an employee to take leave.
  • No documentation is required until the employee takes 3 or more consecutive days off.
  • Employers cannot require employees to search for, or provide, a replacement worker to cover the hours missed.
  • Employers cannot "take retaliatory personnel action or discriminate" against employees exercising their sick and safe time rights.
  • Paid leave can be taken for:  
    • An employee's own mental or physical illness, injury, health condition, need for medical care or treatment, or need for a medical procedure or preventative medical care;
    • To care for an employee's family member's mental or physical illness, injury, health condition, need for medical care or treatment, or who needs a medical procedure or preventative medical care;
    • The closure of the employee's place of business, or to care for a child whose school or place of care has been closed, due to a public health emergency;
    • To seek a civil protection order to prevent domestic abuse pursuant to Section 13-14-102, C.R.S.;
    • To obtain medical care or mental health counseling, or both, for the employee or employee's children to address physical or psychological injuries from domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or other crime involving domestic violence;
    • To make the employee's home secure, or to seek new housing, due to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or other crime involving domestic violence; and
    • To seek legal assistance to address issues arising from domestic abuse, stalking, sexual assault, or other crime involving domestic violence, and attend or prepare for court-related proceedings.

Unclear and Potentially Troublesome Provisions

1.  Definition of "Family Member" Too Broad

Although seemingly modeled after the San Francisco and D.C. bills, Denver's new paid leave ordinance includes a far broader definition of "family member" than any prior bill passed. It includes:  

* A person related by blood, marriage or legal adoption, including a child, parent, spouse, sibling, grandparent, or grandchild of the employee;

* A foster child, parent, sibling, grandparent, or grandchild of the employee;

* A child to whom the employee stands in loco parentis or for whom the employee is the legal guardian;

* The employee's domestic partner;

* The spouse of an employee's child, parent, sibling, or grandparent;

* A legal guardian of the employee or a person who stood in loco parentis to the employee when he or she was a minor;

* A parent of the employee's spouse; or

* Any other individual related by blood or affinity whose close relationship is equivalent to a family relationship.

The spouse of an employee's sibling? Call me crazy, but I think it is a real problem to obligate a small business owner to provide paid time off for an employee to take his or her sister's husband to a routine doctor's appointment. Or, to leave open all the possible individuals covered under the vague phrase "any other individual related by blood or affinity whose close relationship is equivalent to a family relationship." I wonder when we would see the first complaint involving a worker claiming that his or her college roommate is "like family."

2.  Unclear How to Count Number of Employees or Who May Be Eligible

It is unclear how employers will be required to count their number of employees to determine the amount of leave benefits that must be offered.  The definition of employer includes all businesses in the State of Colorado.  But, the definition of an eligible employee is anyone employed within the geographic boundaries of the City and County of Denver.  So, for purposes of determining the amount of leave benefits, are employers required to count all employees in Colorado, or only those employed within the City and County of Denver?  

Likewise, if employees need only be employed in the City of County of Denver for 40 hours a year to be eligible, is a worker whose main office is located elsewhere in Colorado, but who travels to Denver frequently throughout the year for deliveries or to conduct business, eligible for the mandated leave benefits? 

3.  No Advance Notice Required

Where other paid sick leave bills expressly authorize employers to require reasonable notice to be given where practicable when an employee's need for leave arises, Denver's new proposed ordinance vaguely says that employers "may not impose unreasonable barriers to use of paid sick and safe time."  What does that mean?  An "unreasonable barrier" in one instance could be reasonable under different circumstances. The use of such vague language, rather than clear language allowing employers to require advance notice where practicable, in my view, tips the scale of this legislation away from fair and balanced.   

4.  Employers Prohibited From Requesting Documentation

Additionally, where other sick leave bills allow employers to require appropriate documentation to support the leave to prevent abuse, Denver's proposed ordinance prohibits employers from requesting any documentation, until after 3 consecutive days of absence.

5.  Employers Already Offering Generous Leave Benefits Not Necessarily Exempt

Finally, even though the new ordinance attempts to exempt employers who already provide vacation or personal time off (PTO) in an amount equivalent or greater than the mandated 9 (or 5) days of leave benefits, the rub is that employers must allow the vacation or PTO "under the same conditions as paid sick and safe time" - meaning that if the other leave benefits require prior notice and/or documentation, this new leave bank must be provided in addition.  This is another major difference between Denver's proposed sick leave ordinance than those passed in San Francisco, D.C. and Connecticut. At least in those ordinances or bills, employers who offered more leave days than that legislatively mandated, were deemed in compliance, without all the other restrictions.  

Food for Thought

The Agency for Human Rights and Community Relations (staffed currently by 10 people) in Denver would be responsible for implementing and administering this new law, taking complaints, conducting investigations, holding hearings, providing conciliation, issuing orders, and imposing fines. With only 10 individuals currently in the Agency, the implementation of this new ordinance along with a potential influx of complaints may likely require expansion, using already-tight taxpayer dollars.

Everyone knows that successful, long-term and mutually beneficial employment relationships require employees and employers to work together, and there are a multitude of good employers in Denver and throughout Colorado who strive to keep their workforce happy with generous benefit packages. I am certainly not advocating that employees come to work sick or face losing their job if their child is sent home from school sick.  But, is imposing overly broad, vague legislation with unusually restrictive obligations on large and small employers alike, however good in principal, what Denver needs in this economic climate? Governor John Hickenlooper and Mayor Michael Hancock say no, and it is now up to Denver voters to decide in November. 

*********************************************************************

UPDATE:  Since first publishing this blog post, Seattle passed its version of paid sick leave legislation in September 2011.  Seattle's 50-page ordinance was approved by the City Council on September 12, 2011 and signed into law by the Mayor on September 23, 2011.  Although I have not done a complete side-by-side comparison with Denver's proposed ordinance, one primary difference is that Seattle's ordinance provides that employees must work at least 240 hours per year in Seattle to be eligible, while Denver's proposed ordinance provides leave benefits for eligible employees who work only 40 hours each calendar year. 

Colorado Employer's Law Blog Nominated!

LexisNexis Top 25 Blogs 2011.bmpI am pleased to announce that Colorado Employer's Law Blog has been nominated as a candidate for the LexisNexis Top 25 Labor and Employment Law Blogs of 2011!  To support Colorado Employer's Law Blog's nomination, please vote by commenting on the announcement post on LexisNexis' Labor and Employment Law Community Page

Each comment is counted as a vote.  To submit a comment:

1.  Log on to your LexisNexis Communities account on the right side of the Labor and Employment Law Community Page, then vote by making a comment at the bottom of the blog nomination page while logged in; or

2.  If you haven't previously registered, you can register on the Labor and Employment Law Community Registration Page for free.  Then, vote by making a comment in the comment box at the very bottom of the blog nomination page after registering.

Please vote early and often! The comment period closes on September 12, 2011.  Thanks for your support!

BREAKING NEWS: Colorado Supreme Court Says Continued At-Will Employment Is Sufficient Consideration For Noncompetition Agreement

On May 31, 2011, in a decision critical to non-compete law in Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its holding in Lucht's Concrete Pumping Inc. v. Horner (PDF).  I previously blogged about the fluctuating state of Colorado's non-compete law given the decisions below in the Lucht's case -- Colorado Non-Compete Law in Flux (October 7, 2010).  For many who have been watching and waiting, The Decision (my sport's reference for the day...go Heat) has arrived, and it's favorable for employers.

Decisions Below

  • The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employee (Horner) concluding that his noncompetition agreement was unenforceable due to lack of consideration, as he was not offered any additional monetary payment, raise, benefits, etc. in exchange for the non-compete covenant that his employer (Lucht's) wanted him to sign after he was hired. 
  • The employer (Lucht's) appealed.
  • The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and concluded that continued employment of an at-will employee cannot, by itself, constitute consideration for a non-competition covenant if the employee had already begun working.
  • The employer (Lucht's) appealed again.

Colorado Supreme Court Reverses

In an en banc decision, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals:

"We hold that an employer that forbears from terminating an existing at-will employee forbears from exercising a legal right, and that therefore such forbearance constitutes adequate consideration for a noncompetition agreement.  We have recognized that continuation of at-will employment is adequate consideration in the context of an employee's receipt of a benefit, Continental Air Lines [v. Keenan], 731 P.2d [708,] 711 [(Colo. 1987)], and now apply that reasoning to the context of consideration for a noncompetition agreement."

The Court reasoned that because employment in Colorado is at-will, meaning that an employer may terminate an at-will employee at any time during the employment relationship as a matter of right, the forbearance from terminating an employee presented with a non-compete agreement after hire is sufficient consideration for such an agreement.  The Court further reiterated that there appears to be no question that sufficient consideration for a non-compete agreement exists when entered into at the commencement of at-will employment. 

So, there you have it.  The Colorado Supreme Court says continued at-will employment is sufficient consideration for non-compete covenants.  Employers may rejoice - there is no need to go back and offer more money or benefits to employees who have signed noncompetition agreements after hire. 

See related entry: Colorado Non-Compete Law in Flux - October 7, 2010

Colleague and Friend, Tom Christina, Files Amicus Brief in Important Affordable Care Act Case

HealthCareReform2.jpgI previously blogged in March 2011 on the 1-year anniversary of health care reform.  At that time, the 5 principal cases challenging the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act had moved from the district courts to the federal Courts of Appeals.  Currently, these cases are almost fully briefed, and 2 of them have been argued.

As we await these important decisions, I had an opportunity to talk about the cases with one of my colleagues, Tom Christina, who spoke about them in a conference in Chicago earlier this month. 

Tom also filed an Amicus Brief in State of Florida v. United States Department of Health & Human Services (PDF), which is pending before the Eleventh Circuit.  Here are some quick facts about the Florida case (PDF of decision below), which is very significant for the future of U.S. health care reform:

  • The case challenges the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and was filed minutes after President Obama signed the new law.
  • It was brought by the Attorneys General and/or Governors of 26 states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), 2 private citizens, and the National Federation of Independent Business.
  • The defendants are the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Labor, and their secretaries.
  • In granting summary judgment in favor of the states and other plaintiffs, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida (Judge Vinson) held that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause by requiring most individuals to have health insurance coverage beginning in 2014. 
  • The District Court also ruled that this “individual mandate” provision could not be severed from the remainder of the statute, causing the entire Affordable Care Act to be void. 
  • The Eleventh Circuit appeal was filed by the defendants (Department of Health & Human Services, Department of Treasury, Department of Labor, and their secretaries), seeking to overturn the district court ruling in favor of the states and other plaintiffs.

Below is a summary of my conversation with Tom about the issues in the Florida case and the oral arguments before the Fourth Circuit on May 10, 2011, in two other “Obamacare” cases --  Liberty University v. Geithner and Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius.

JLG:  Tom, the Fourth Circuit heard oral argument in Liberty University v. Geithner and Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius on May 10, 2011.  Having reviewed the audio files of the arguments, what issues seemed to interest the Fourth Circuit Judges most?

TMC:  In Commonwealth of Virginia, the panel seemed to zero in on whether a state can bring a lawsuit to declare that its citizens’ rights are violated by a federal statute. 

In Liberty University, there were two questions that I think were equally important to the Fourth Circuit panel.  First, they wanted the plaintiffs to clarify that their lawsuit was challenging only the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act.  Second, they questioned whether Congress could regulate individuals’ decisions to purchase insurance coverage, even if that decision is not an activity affecting interstate commerce, as long as the individual mandate is part of a much larger regulatory statute aimed at regulating how Americans pay for health care. 

JLG:  What’s your read on how the argument went for each side? 

TMC:  The Judges seemed troubled by the idea that a state could bring a lawsuit challenging the individual mandate because the individual mandate falls on the state’s citizens, not on the state itself.  They also seemed receptive to the government’s argument regarding the scope of Congress’ power.  Neal Katyal, the Acting Solicitor General of the United States, argued both cases for the government, which is very unusual.  The SG ordinarily argues cases only before the U.S. Supreme Court.  He is a very polished advocate. 

JLG:  What is the focus of your Amicus Brief in State of Florida v. United States Department of Health & Human Services (PDF)?  Does it address the same questions that the Fourth Circuit focused on? 

TMC:  Our brief in the Florida case primarily addresses the “severability” issue.  We ask the Eleventh Circuit to affirm Judge Vinson’s ruling that the entire Act is void if any provision is unconstitutional, and we suggest a legal basis for that ruling that the courts might otherwise overlook. 

Specifically, the Act was passed under a very unusual rule adopted by the House of Representatives that required considering it only on an “all or nothing” basis, with no severability provision and no possibility of amendments.  The Senate version of healthcare was adopted on December 24, 2009, when the Democrats still had a filibuster-proof majority.  However, before the majority leadership of the House and Senate could reconcile their differences on healthcare reform, the Massachusetts special Senate election gave Republicans enough votes in the Senate to filibuster.  House leaders knew that if there were any amendments to the Senate version of the bill by the House, the entire bill would then have to go back to the Senate, where a filibuster would prevent it from being enacted.  To avoid that result, the House leadership brought the Senate version to the floor under a special rule that prohibited any amendments, so each Representative was required to vote for or against the Act as a “package deal,” with no severability clause.

JLG:  Does that argument help the states and other plaintiffs in the Florida case on the merits of their Constitutional claims? 

TMC:  We think so.  If the Eleventh Circuit accepts the principle that the entire Act is void if any provision is void, the states and the private plaintiffs in the Florida case can broaden their attack.   For example, they can explain that the individual mandate is an integral part of forcing the states to establish and pay for “Exchanges” where required coverage will be sold, which in turn dovetails with various other tax provisions in the Act, and so on.

JLG:  What happens next? 

TMC:  In the Florida case, the states will file a reply brief on May 25, 2011, and oral argument is scheduled for June 8, 2011.  Eventually, everyone expects these issues will make their way to the U.S. Supreme Court later this year.


UPDATE - On August 11, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its 207-page decision and 84-page dissent (PDF), affirming the district court's (Judge Vinson's) ruling that the health insurance mandate is unconstitutional.  However, the Court held that the other provisions of the law are "severable" from the individual mandate, and therefore, may be upheld.  Because the 11th Circuit decision is in contrast to the recent 6th Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act on June 29, 2011, all signs point to the U.S. Supreme Court as the next stop.

There's An App For That! The Bright Side to the U.S. Department of Labor's Launch of iPhone App to Track Wages

iPhone4.jpg

On May 9, 2011, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a news release announcing the launch of its first application for smartphones - a timesheet to help employees independently track the hours they work and determine the wages they are owed.  The App, called "DOL - Timesheet," is available to download for free on iTunes

Since the DOL's announcement, blogs and tweets have been flying about this new tool developed by the DOL Wage & Hour Division (WHD) as part of its ongoing efforts to "achieve compliance with labor standards to protect and enhance the welfare of the Nation's workforce."  In other words, the DOL WHD has been cracking down on employers who are not in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) with respect to the proper payment of wages (minimum wage, overtime), classification of employees (exempt vs. non-exempt), and recordkeeping, and many are viewing this new iPhone App as just another tool in the DOL WHD's arsenal in the war against employers (the App contains a link to the DOL WHD and information on how to make a complaint). 

Amidst the naysaying, there just may be some potentially positive aspects of the new App for employers (who, by law, are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete time and pay records):

  1. Employees Now Have More Electronic Discovery Obligations.  Employees who install and use the "DOL - Timesheet" App now have their own electronic data and information that they must maintain and preserve in the event a claim arises.  Most cases involving the preservation (or improper destruction) of electronic data involve employers getting sanctioned for failing to put proper litigation holds in place and/or destroying relevant information.  But now, with employee-maintained programs and Apps, the balance of the electronic discovery playing field may be becoming a little more even.  Where employees fail to preserve and not destroy any relevant electronic time and wage records in their possession, employers may be in a position to move for sanctions up to dismissal of a claim depending on the circumstances and level of spoliation.  One can also only hope that with the new electronic tools available to employees, courts will begin to crack down on Plaintiff's lawyers for not properly counseling their clients on "litigation holds" to ensure that the individuals preserve relevant electronic information, including personal emails, text messages, Facebook information, and now, iPhone data. 
  2. We May See Less 'Cocktail Hour' Stories About Hours Worked.  Documented time records are far better than relying on an employee's memory or guesswork at the amount of work actually performed.  Everyone knows that guy at the cocktail party who says he "works like a dog...80 hours a week!" is exaggerating a bit.  Still, when the DOL WHD investigates wage and hour complaints, and there is a lack of complete records for whatever reason (e.g., the employee is claiming off-the-clock work or it's a case involving misclassification of an exempt employee), they rely on these very types of 'cocktail hour' statements by employees, which generally operate to provide windfalls to employees.  Now, where employees may be tracking hours and wages on their iPhones, here's hoping that employers will be dealing with fewer verbal statements describing an actual 48-hour week as an 80-hour one. 

It remains to be seen how much use this new DOL - Timesheet App will get and how it may play into wage and hour claims and/or lawsuits.  But, it will be interesting to follow and see if employers can make lemonade out of lemons by effectively utilizing this new tool as an additional discovery device to possibly find and use key information that could make or break a case. 

The Affordable Care Act: Something to Think About While Waiting for the Courts of Appeals to Decide the "Individual Mandate" Issue

Healthcare Debate.jpgAs the first anniversary of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act approaches (it was signed into law March 23, 2010), 5 district courts across the nation have addressed the constitutionality of this controversial piece of legislation (U.S. District Court, Northern District of Florida (PDF)U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan (PDF); U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (PDF)U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia (PDF); and U.S. District Court, Western District of Virginia (PDF)).  The score is 3-2 in the federal government’s favor, but all 5 cases are on appeal.  The principal issue in these cases is the constitutionality of the Act’s “individual mandate,” which requires most individuals to purchase health insurance beginning in 2014 or face a penalty of up to $2,085 per year.  

Does Congress Have Authority Under the Commerce Clause to Penalize Individuals for Not Having Health Insurance?

This is the question for the Courts of Appeals.  The Justice Department says YES, because the Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority “to regulate commerce . . . among the several States.”  This authority has been interpreted broadly over the years, and there is a consensus that the Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, even if the activities take place entirely within a single state. 

District Courts Split on Whether Being Uninsured Is An "Activity" or "Inactivity"

The district courts disagree as to whether being uninsured is an “activity” under the Commerce Clause, or merely “inactivity.”  For the "inactivity" argument, the reasoning is that being uninsured is the result of not buying insurance, which is a failure to act, and therefore, falls outside Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Opponents of the act use the "inactivity" argument to show the Act is unconstitutional.  However, the 3 district courts that ruled in the federal government’s favor reached the opposite conclusion.  In their view, everyone will need medical care eventually, and therefore, failing to have health insurance is the product of a decision to pay for future medical treatment out of pocket instead of through insurance.  Those courts ruled that making that decision is an “activity” which affects interstate commerce. 

But, What About State Sovereignty?

As the Commerce Clause “activity versus inactivity” issue wends its way through the federal Courts of Appeals on its way to the United States Supreme Court, a colleague of mine, Tom Christina (shareholder in Ogletree Deakins' Greenville, South Carolina office) explained to me that there are additional constitutional issues, beyond just the "individual mandate," that courts should be considering:

  • Tom's argument involves whether the Act offers States a meaningful choice about whether to establish “American Health Insurance Exchanges,” which will be the marketplaces for coverage being in 2014.  Section 1311 of the Act provides that each state “shall” establish such an Exchange, but Section 1322 of the Act allows the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish an Exchange in a state if the state fails or refuses to do so, or if it is not moving forward quickly enough.  By tracing through hundreds of pages of the Act, Tom noticed that there is an important difference between Exchanges established by the states under Section 1311 and those established by HHS under Section 1322.  Under the Act, a tax credit becomes available beginning in 2014 to help taxpayers pay for coverage, but the amount of the credit is zero unless the taxpayer buys insurance coverage from a Section 1311 Exchange.  Thus, taxpayers in states that failed or refused to establish an Exchange are punished by being ineligible for a federal tax credit available to voters in states that established Exchanges. 

Hadley Health of the Independent Women’s Forum blogged about the above alternative argument that State plaintiffs could make to go beyond the "individual mandate" question.  She noted that Tom developed this “sovereignty-based” argument at a presentation at the American Enterprise Institute in December 2010.  Hadley wrote

No external entity is allowed to influence a state’s political process.  And the federal government is external of the state.  The health reform law provides income tax credits to individuals in exchanges established by states, but not to individuals in exchanges established by the federal government (in non-electing states).  How will voters react to this, if understood correctly?  The choice of their state to establish or not to establish an exchange will impact the tax credits that citizens receive. 

The sovereignty of states is undermined, because the adoption of this law is hardly “voluntary.”  States have been put in a bad position, and I hope that the discussion of these health care exchanges will resurface in another case.

Tom's experience as a former Associate Deputy Attorney General during the Reagan Administration enabled him to immediately recognize the potential federalism concerns raised by a statutory program that brings outside pressure to bear on a state’s decision to establish Exchanges.  Based on the different treatment of taxpayers in cooperating states compared with taxpayers in non-cooperating states, Tom advanced an argument for the unconstitutionality of the Act based on federal interference with state legislative and executive processes.

For those who are interested in the details of Tom's argument, his PowerPoint Slides (PDF) lay out the statutory provisions in issue and U.S. Supreme Court cases involving federal-state relations that the states could rely on.  You also can see or hear the AEI presentation at AEI’s website (Tom’s portion of the panel discussion begins approximately 56 minutes into the program).

U.S. Supreme Court Throws Curve Balls At Employers

iStock_000000879475XSmall.jpgOpening day for the Colorado Rockies at Coors Field is Friday, April 1, 2011.  It is a day of excitement, anticipation, feigned illnesses, and sell out crowds. Not only does baseball season start on a Friday this year (it has been Mondays since 1905), but it also falls on April Fools Day. Given these oddities, I can't help but wonder if there is the slightest chance that the U.S. Supreme Court may say "April Fools!" when it comes to the first two major employment law decisions of 2011. Rather than create bright line tests, these cases seem to create more confusion than clarity - and most certainly, feel like the Court is throwing employers some major curve balls.

Court Finds Third Party Title VII Retaliation Claims Are Viable

In Thomspon v. North American Stainless, L.P. (PDF), Eric Thompson and his fiance, Miriam Regalado, both worked for North American Stainless.  Ms. Regalado filed a charge of sex discrimination against the company with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  Mr. Thompson was fired three weeks later. Mr. Thompson claimed he was fired because of his fiance's complaint.  North American Stainless said his termination was based on performance problems.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of North American Stainless, finding that third party retaliation claims were not permitted by Title VII.  On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  Certiorari was granted and oral argument took place on December 7, 2010.  On January 24, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held:

Title VII's antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct. Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006). It prohibits any employer action that well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.  We think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiance would be fired.

The Court went on to state:

We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are unlawful. We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.  As we explained in Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69, "the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances."  Given the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII's antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules.

Not only do retaliation claims generally pose the greatest risk to employers because of their amorphous nature, but now, companies are facing a brand new type of retaliation - one that arises from an employee who has a mere relationship with another employee who engaged in protected activity.  Prior to this case, the anti-retaliaton provisions of Title VII were simply held not to apply to third parties.  Now, the U.S. Supreme Court says that third party retaliation claims are viable, but provides little guidance as to the class of individuals that fall under protection.  As a result, expect more litigation on this issue to define just how far the anti-retaliation provisions may stretch.

'Cat's Paw' Liability in Discrimination Cases Turns on Proximate Cause

There were high hopes that the Court's decision in Staub v. Proctor Hospital (PDF) would resolve the split in circuits regarding the 'cat's paw' theory of liability in employment discrimination cases.  I wrote about 'cat's paw' liability generally, the oral argument that took place on November 2, 2010, and the various tests that have been applied by the circuit courts for the American Bar Association Labor and Employment Flash.  Although Staub involves the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), its language is "very similar to Title VII," in that employers are prohibited from engaging in certain actions if the employee's protected status is a "motivating factor in the employer's action."  As such, this case has ramifications far beyond military service discrimination.  

On March 1, 2011, in an 8-0 decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court seemingly rejects the prior tests applied by the various circuit courts and instead, adopts a new formula for 'cat's paw' liability based on the tort theory of proximate cause.  The Court held:

"if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA."

As Jon Hyman points out in his blog, this case hinges on a new test involving fact-based inquiries regarding "intent" and "proximate cause," which nearly guarantees that any case involving 'cat's paw' liability will be difficult, if not impossible, to be resolved on summary judgment and will go to trial - an expensive proposition for employers.  My sense is that, had this case involved any other form of discrimination other than related to military service, we may have seen an entirely different result.          

Tenth Circuit State Versus Federal Right to Sue Notices

Colorado, like many other states, has both a state employment discrimination agency, the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD), and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The state and federal agencies have a worksharing agreement in place that authorizes shared responsibilities in reviewing and investigating charges of discrimination. Practically speaking, this means that an employee may file a charge with either the CCRD or EEOC in Colorado, and often times, depending on the workloads, a charge may be passed from one agency to the other for investigation. However, even though both agencies are empowered to investigate charges, the Tenth Circuit has held each agency must independently terminate its own jurisdiction. An employee's right to sue, therefore, alleging state or federal claims, turns on who has issued a right to sue notice, and when.

In Rodriguez v. Wet Ink LLC, a case decided by the Tenth Circuit on April 26, 2010, Patricia Rodriguez filed charges of discrimination with the CCRD and EEOC, alleging that her supervisor discriminated against her based on her national origin, ancestry and gender, and that she was fired in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. The CCRD investigated and found no cause for the national origin and retaliation claims, but found merit with the gender discrimination claim and referred the claim to mediation. Following an unsuccessful mediation, Ms. Rodriguez requested a right to sue notice from both the CCRD and EEOC. The CCRD issued its right to sue notice on November 25, 2007. The EEOC then issued its right to sue notice on January 29, 2008. Thereafter, Ms. Rodriguez filed suit in federal district court on April 25, 2008.

Both Colorado and federal law require a discrimination plaintiff to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right to sue notice. Because Ms. Rodriguez filed suit on April 25, 2008 - five months after receiving her CCRD right to sue notice, Wet Ink LLC moved to dismiss the case as being time barred. The district court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state agency right to sue notice did not trigger the federal filing period because: (1) the worksharing agreement does not authorize the CCRD to issue right to sue notices on behalf of the EEOC; and (2) the CCRD notice did not trigger Title VII's 90-day limitations period.  

What this means is that employers should carefully scrutinize right to sue notices to ensure that the state and/or federal agencies have terminated their respective jurisdiction.  The deadline to file federal claims is triggered only when the EEOC expressly terminates its jurisdiction via an EEOC right to sue notice.  Likewise, an employee who receives only a CCRD right to sue notice arguably only has a right to file a lawsuit alleging state law claims (unless and until the EEOC issues its right to sue notice or its jurisdiction is otherwise terminated), and must do so within 90 days of receiving the notice.